At 7:15... Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles. Within the next 20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by CAPPS.The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the airline’s customer service representative at the check-in counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he understand English, and because the agent found both of the passengers to be suspicious.The only consequence of their selection was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft.
(7:29 a.m. and later) September 11, 2001: The other hijackers check in
The Hazmis checked in at 7:29
Flight #77, scheduled to leave Dulles at 8:10 a.m., pushed back from the gate at 8:09 a.m. and departed at 8:20 a.m.
(8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 handed off to Indianapolis ATC
After proceeding normally through air space controlled by the Washington Air Traffic Control Center (Washington Center), Flight 77 was handed off to the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center (Indianapolis Center), with which it made routine radio contact.
(8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cruising altitude
Flight 77 reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun, with Renee May likely working in the first-class galley between the cockpit and first class, Michele Heidenberger in the galley at the rear of the plane, Jennifer Lewis circulating in first-class, and Kenneth Lewis in the main cabin.
(8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: The last routine radio communication
At approximately 8:51 a.m., Flight 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication — the cockpit acknowledging air traffic control navigational instructions.
(8:51 - 8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: The hijack begins
Between 8:51 A.M. and 8:54 A.M., the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. They initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives and box cutters (reported by one passenger) and moved all of the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger).
(8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 changes course
At approximately 8:54 a.m., Flight 77 deviated from its assigned course by making a slight turn to the south.
(8:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001: The transponder is turned off
At 8:56 a.m., the transponder on Flight 77 was switched off and the aircraft was lost on primary radar.
The transponder was switched off, and the aircraft was lost on primary radar. The controller tracking Flight 77 continued to look for it. He searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, fast calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis Center controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed Flight 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and was gone. At the same time, the Indianapolis Center made the first of ten unsuccessful attempts over the next six and a half minutes to contact the aircraft via radio.
Shortly after 8:56 A.M., the Indianapolis Center controller reached out to controllers in other sectors at Indianapolis Center to advise them of the situation. The controllers agreed to "sterilize the air space" along the flight's projected westerly route so that other planes would not be affected by Flight 77. Two Indianapolis Center managers joined the controller responsible for Flight 77 in searching for the flight. The managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for Flight 77.
8:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines are alerted
At 8:58 a.m., FAA air traffic control contacted American Airlines to advise that contact with Flight 77 had been lost. American Airlines dispatchers began unsuccessfully to attempt to contact Flight 77 using the ACARS system.
(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines ground some flights
American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that communication had been lost with Flight 77. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground.
By 9:00 a.m., Flight 77 had turned to the east and had begun to descend.
(Some time between 9:00 and 9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American group stop goes nationwide
An American Airlines air traffic control specialist at SOC who was in communication with the Herndon Command Center notified SOC air traffic control manager that he had learned United was "missing a plane." American headquarters extended its ground stop nationwide.
(9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 location is lost
The FAA's air traffic controllers told American Airlines that they did not know the location of Flight 77 and were unable to contact it. Three minutes later, American began lockout procedures to protect information about the flight.
(9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 still undetected
Flight 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes, well east of its last known position. However, the aircraft was not detected by air traffic controllers because they were searching along its projected flight path to the west and southwest.
(9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001: A change in course
At approximately 9:07 a.m., Flight 77 leveled off at 25,000 feet and made a slight course change to the east-northeast.
9:08 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines believe Flight 77 may have crashed into the WTC
By 9:08 A.m., officials in American Airlines' SOC had concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77.
The FAA's Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force Search and Rescue in Langley, Virginia, to request that they be on the lookout for an accident involving Flight 77 because of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and all radar contact.
(9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Indianapolis alert the FAA
Indianapolis Center called the FAA Great Lakes Regional Office to notify it of a possible accident involving American 77.
(9:11 a.m. and later) September 11, 2001: Renee May places a phone call about the hijacking
Renee May, a flight attendant, attempted to call her parents but the call did not connect. A second call to the same number at 9:12 A.M. did go through. In the conversation, May told her mother that her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them--the mother was not sure whether her daughter meant all the passengers or just the crew—to the rear of the plane. May asked her mother to call American Airlines and make sure that they knew about the hijacking, giving her three phone numbers in Northern Virginia to call.
At some point between 9:12 A.M. and the crash of Flight 77 into the Pentagon (9:37:46 A.M.), Renee May's parents reached an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C., giving her the information provided by their daughter, including her phone number on board and the flight number. Initially, the American employee thought the Mays were talking about the aircraft that had crashed into the World Trade Center. May's mother reiterated that she was speaking of Flight 77, still in the air. At some point after completing the call, the American employee was told to evacuate the building. On her way out, she heard explosions from the direction of the Pentagon, though she was not sure that it was the crash of an aircraft. She informed a flight services manager at the airport about her conversation with May's parents.
(Around 9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines orders a ground stop
After confirming that two airliners had struck the World Trade Center American ordered all of its airborne flights to land.
(9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001:
An American Airlines air traffic control specialist phoned an official at the Herndon Command Center to inquire about the status of New York City air traffic. Over the course of this conversation, which lasted two and a half minutes, the specialist said that American "thought" Flight 11 had crashed into the World Trade Center. Flight 77, he said, was "missing." As he made his report, he received an update from American's SOC indicating that Flight 77 also might have crashed into the towers. He updated the ATC official but wondered how Flight 77 could have gotten to New York City. The ATC official replied that the second crash might not have been Flight 77 because "we [ATC] have another call sign" for that incident. At that point, though, the Herndon Command Center was not sure of the identity of either of the two crashed aircraft and provided no further information
(Some time between 9:16 and 9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Barbara Olson makes a call about the hijacking
Barbara Olson, a Flight 77 passenger, called her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. Olson spoke to his wife for about one minute before the call was cut off. She reported that the flight had been hijacked and the hijackers were wielding knives and box cutters. She did not mention stabbing or slashing of the crew or passengers. The hijackers, she said, were not aware of her phone call. All of the passengers were in the back of the plane. Barbara Olson had been seated in first class. After this call, Ted Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft. He contacted the Department of Justice Command Center and requested that they send someone to his office. He also told the Department of Justice Command Center that his wife's flight had been hijacked and gave them the flight number.
(9:18 a.m. at the latest) September 11, 2001: FAA aware
By no later than 9:18 A.M., FAA centers in Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Washington were aware that Flight 77 was missing and that two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center.
(9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Indianapolis think Flight 77 may still be airborne
By 9:20 A.M., Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Herndon Command Center prompted the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 was lost. (9:20 - 9:31 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Barbara Olson calls with more information
Barbara Olson again called her husband. During their second conversation, she reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location. She said that the aircraft was flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. Ted Olson informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes, but she did not display signs of panic or indicate any awareness of an impending crash. The call abruptly ended.
(9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Searching for Flight 77
By 9:21 A.M., the Herndon Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for Flight 77. They feared it had been hijacked.
Herndon Command Center advised a supervisor at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility that the FAA had lost contact with Flight 77 and was trying to find the aircraft. Controllers at Dulles TRACON were advised that a commercial aircraft was missing and instructed to look for primary targets.
(9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center say Flight 11 is still airborne
NEADS received a report from Boston Center that "it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower" and that Flight 11 was still airborne and "heading towards Washington." NEADS personnel immediately began an active search for the aircraft.
The Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked.
The Command Center advised the Dulles terminal control facility, which urged its controllers to search for the craft. The military's NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) did not know about the search for American 77. Instead, it heard once again about a plane that no longer existed, American 11. NEADS (the Northeast Air Defense Sector) received a report from the FAA around 9:21:
FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards -- heading towards Washington.
NEADS: OK. American 11 is still in the air?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
FAA: That was another -- it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.
That's the latest report we have.
NEADS: OK.
FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
NEADS: OK. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?
FAA: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS: He -- American 11 is a hijack?
FAA:Yes.
NEADS: And he's heading into Washington?
FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircraft.
The mention of a "third aircraft" was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne.
The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the Mission Crew Commander. He reported to the NEADS Battle Commander:
Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: OK, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. OK? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.
(9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Great Lakes call FAA HQ
The FAA's Great Lakes Regional Office notified the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C., that Flight 77 might have been involved in an accident.
(9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Nationwide ground stop
Herndon Command Center advised FAA headquarters that Flight 77 was lost in Indianapolis Center's airspace. It could not be located on radar.
Ben Sliney, the Herndon Command Center National Operations Manager, ordered a "nationwide ground stop," which prevented any aircraft from taking off in the United States.
(9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 autopilot is turned off
At 9:29 a.m., Flight 77 was flying at 7,000 feet and was approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. The autopilot was turned off.
(9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Dulles watch approaching target on radar
At 9:32 a.m., controllers at Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate and notified Reagan National Airport.
Todd Lewis is working radar at Dulles airport.
Todd Lewis: One of my colleagues saw a primary target moving quite fast from northwest to the southeast. Nobody knew that was American 77. Brokaw: What did you think, it was a military flight of some kind—Lewis: I thought it was a military flight. I thought that Langley had scrambled some fighters and maybe one of ‘em got up there. Brokaw: It was really moving fast—Lewis: It was moving very fast, like a military aircraft might move at a low altitude.Brokaw: How long were you able to track what turned out to be American—Lewis: It was heading right towards a prohibited area in downtown Washington. And that covers the Capitol and the White House. We then called the White House on the hotline, and let them know.
Controllers activate a hotline to the Secret Service—and within seconds, agents are frantically evacuating the White House. The president is in Florida, but the secret service whisks vice president Dick Cheney into an underground bunker.
Lewis: Then it turned south and away from the prohibited area, which seemed like a momentary sigh of relief. And it disappeared. But it was going away from Washington, which seemed to be the right thing.
(9:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 begins its right turn
At 9:34 a.m., Flight 77 was five miles west-southwest of the Pentagon. Flight 77 began a 330-degree right turn. At the end of the turn, the plane was at about 2,000 feet and four miles southwest of the Pentagon and pointed toward it. Over the next 30 seconds, power was increased to near maximum and the nose was pitched down.
Also at 9:34 A.M. NEADS Identification Technicians who, at 9:21 A.M., had been told by Boston Center that Flight 11 was still airborne and heading south, contacted the Operations Manager at Washington Center to provide an update on the evolving situation. In the course of the conversation, the Operations Manager informed NEADS that Flight 77 was lost. He did not inform NEADS that it was hijacked because he did not know. This discussion was the first notice to the military that Flight 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call to Washington Center, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that Flight 77 was even missing.
Also at 9:34 A.M., an update by the American Airlines SOC indicated that Flights 11 and 77 had been the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center.
(9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: C-130 tasked to report on radar target
At approximately 9:36 A.M., Reagan Airport controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the primary target identified by Dulles TRACON. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, and attempted to follow its path.
The FAA's Boston Center – which had learned of the unidentified primary radar target tracking eastbound via an FAA conference call line – called NEADS and relayed the report of the aircraft closing in on Washington. The aircraft that still had not been linked with the missing Flight 77. Boston Center told NEADS: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [Visual Flight Rules] six miles southeast of the White House...Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away."
This startling news prompted the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS to order "AFIO" (Authorization for Interceptor Operations), which entailed taking immediate control of the Langley fighters from the FAA. He then ordered the fighters to proceed directly towards Washington DC: "Okay, we're going to turn it ... crank it up...Run them to the White House."
(Shortly after 9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS redirects Langley fighters
., the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north as the scramble order had instructed, but east over the ocean. His response was emotional, "I don't care how many windows you break," he said, "Damn it...0kay. Push them back."
(9:37:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon
At 9:37:46 a.m., Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon. The plane was traveling 530 miles per hour on impact. When it was crashed, Flight 77 had 36,200 pounds of jet fuel on board. Flight 77 carried a crew of two pilots and four flight attendants, 53 passengers, and five hijackers. Everyone on board the plane was killed as were 125 military and civilian personnel in the Pentagon.
(9:38 approx a.m.) September 11, 2001: C-130 reports crash
At approximately 9:38 A.M., the C-130H aircraft reported to Reagan Airport controllers that the aircraft it was attempting to follow crashed into the Pentagon.
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